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1 Introduction
It has been suggested that default probabilities and / or rating transitions might be
related to the business cycle. Bangia et al. (2002), for example, estimate separate rating
transition matrices for NBER recessions and expansions,1 and Nickell et al. (2000)
estimate different rating transition matrices for periods of high, medium and low GDP
growth and find that rating transition matrices are significantly different across these
phases. In both cases, a downturn in the business cycle seems to go hand in hand with
an increase in default probabilities.
It has also been noted, however, that macroeconomic variables seem to be unable to
fully explain default probabilities. Das et al. (2007) produce evidence to suggest that
apart from the macroeconomic and other covariates that they use to model default
intensities, there are unobserved covariates or factors that drive default probabilities.
This is corroborated by for example Koopman et al. (2006), who find that a latent
or unobserved state variable is important in explaining default probabilities or rating
transitions, even in the presence of macro variables.
What this suggests is that a credit cycle that drives default probabilities exists, but
that it cannot be identified by using only macroeconomic data.
Another strand of literature examines the relationship of default probabilities or
default rates, and finds that default rates and recovery rates are negatively correlated
(see e.g. Altman et al., 2005).
The contribution of this paper is to combine these strands of literature and examine
to what extent it is possible to identify a credit cycle using only the data on recovery
rates and default rates, i.e by letting the credit data speak. Intuitively, we formalize
the idea that in “good times”, default rates are low and recoveries are high, and in
“bad times”, default rates are high and recoveries are low. So far, no attempt has been
made to identify the credit cycle on the basis of both recoveries and default events2.
Credit risk can conceptually be thought of as consisting of both default and recovery
risk. If default rates and recovery rates are negatively correlated through an unobserved
1Bangia et al. (2002) also estimate the NBER business cycle transition matrix, and use this to
simulate the unconditional rating transition matrix by this dynamic model, which they compare to the
static rating transition matrix to find that the static rating transition matrix understates default risk.
2Frye (2000) proposed a model based on Vasicek (1987) that is closest in spirit to what we propose
here. His model, however, is phrased in a static context, and cannot therefore be used to identify a
dynamic credit cycle in a consistent manner.
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credit cycle, this could change the view of the credit risk of portfolios quite dramatically,
which has implications for risk management and possibly also for pricing.
In many commercial credit risk models, the default rate and recovery rates are
assumed to be independent,3 or constant.4 If realizations of recoveries are low exactly
at times when many firms default, assuming that recoveries are independent of default
rates or constant will mean an underestimation of credit risk.
In many pricing models, the recovery rate is also assumed to be a constant, or
independent of other factors in the model, either in the model itself or in its empirical
implementation. This will lead to models that understate risk, and hence produce prices
that are too high or spreads that are too low. It has been argued by Huang and Huang
(2003), for instance, that many structural models of credit produce spreads that are too
low once calibrated to match average default probabilities and average recovery rates.
They suggest that this might be due to assuming a risk premium that is constant, when
in reality it is time-varying. The approach presented here does not understate risk and
hence is likely to produce lower prices and higher yields, even without reference to
time-varying risk premia.
Our credit cycle will be an unobserved two-state Markov chain. Making some distri-
butional assumptions about default rates and recoveries will then allow us to estimate
a model akin to the one presented by Hamilton (1989). We show that the resulting
model can be interpreted as a simple version of a reduced form (or intensity) model of
credit (Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995).
Our estimated model allows comparing our credit downturns to recession periods
as determined by the NBER. The beginning of our credit downturns typically precedes
the start of a recession, and continue until after the end of a recession (see e.g. Figure
1). The average duration of a credit downturn is in the range of 4.9 years, as opposed to
an estimated average duration of 4.1 to 4.7 quarters (Hamilton, 1989). Our estimated
credit cycle indicator exhibits some, but not perfect correlation with various macroeco-
nomic variables (e.g. a correlation of 36% with the S&P 500 return, or a correlation of
34% with GDP growth, see Table 14) This indicates that the credit cycle is related to,
but distinct from the macroeconomic cycle. We argue that this explains why previous
studies have found that macroeconomic variables explain only a small proportion in the
3E.g. J.P. Morgan’s CreditMetricsTM model
4E.g. CSFB’s CreditRisk+TM model
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variation of recovery rates (Altman et al., 2005).
We show how the model can be used to calculate loss distributions for portfolios.
Allowing for dependence between default probabilities and recovery rates via the state
of the credit cycle can increase e.g. the 95% VaR of a given portfolio by a factor
of up to 1.7, and even in credit upturns, the VaR can increase by a factor of up to
1.3. Altman et al. (2005) obtain a very similar difference in VaRs on the basis of a
hypothetical simulation exercise; we can confirm on the basis of our estimated model
that their numbers are very, very plausible. Also, Hu and Perraudin (2002) estimate
the tails of actual loss distributions on the basis of extreme value theory, and compare
that with the tail estimate based on losses calculated by historical simulation assuming
independence between recoveries and default probabilities, and produce a qualitatively
similar result, i.e. they find that for a given confidence level, quantiles of actual losses
are much large than quantiles of hypothetical losses assuming independence. They do
not identify the credit cycle, however.
The difference in VaRs is economically significant, and should be taken into account
e.g. by banks attempting to implement the Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach
of Basel II, under which they can calculate their own default probabilities and estimates
of loss given default.
Several hypotheses explaining why recoveries might be low in times when many firms
default have been suggested. Altman et al. (2005) argue that the markets for defaulted
securities have limited capacity (i.e. demand for these securities is not perfectly elastic
as standard asset pricing theory would suggest), and when many of these appear at the
same time, this depresses the price of defaulted securities. If recovery is measured as the
price of a defaulted security as a fraction of par (as is standard practice), then of course
this would depress recoveries in times of large default rates. Regressing recovery rates
on e.g. the aggregate default rate as an indicator of the aggregate supply of defaulted
bonds, they find a negative relationship. When adding macroeconomic variables such
as GDP growth, they also find that these do not contribute much to explaining recovery
rates.
Two competing hypotheses were examined by Acharya et al. (forthcoming), who
argue that recoveries might be low in times when the industry of the defaulting firm
is in distress because this implies both a lower economic worth of the defaulting firm’s
assets, as well as a lower resale value of the firms assets because of the firms of the
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same industry, i.e. those firms that could put the assets to the most productive use,
are financially constrained. This second hypothesis was first developed by Shleifer and
Vishny (1992). Acharya et al. (forthcoming) produce evidence to suggest that the
second “fire-sales” hypothesis is a likely explanation, and note that industry distress
dummies explain a large part of the apparent effect of the aggregate supply of defaulted
bonds. The data seems to indicate that industries are in distress at the same time; this
leaves the question as to why they would be in distress simultaneously.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) analyze the effects of productivity shocks on the business
cycle in the presence of interactions between borrowing constraints and asset prices.
Similarly to Shleifer and Vishny (1992), they argue that given a negative productivity
shock, the net worth of firms diminishes and the demand for assets (in the presence
of credit constrains) decreases. This lowers the price of assets and thus the net worth
of these constrained firms. But this might reduce the future net worth of these firms.
So in the presence of credit limits, effects of a productivity shock can be transmitted
into the future. This creates a business and credit cycle out of productivity shocks
and credit constraints. Although they do not explicitly discuss defaults or recoveries,
it is possible to imagine a version of the model in which more firms default and less is
recovered in situation when prices of assets are depressed.
Sua´rez and Sussman (2007) present a model that is similar in spirit in which the
presence of financial constraints together with the effects of liquidations on asset prices
can produce endogenous fluctuations (i.e. without productivity shocks).
In conclusion, there is empirical evidence as well as theoretical considerations that
make it plausible that recovery rates and default rates would be related to a credit
cycle, which in turn could be related to the business cycle.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The model is presented in section
2. Relationships between the model and standard reduced-form models of credit are
explored in section 3. In section 4 we describe the data set used. Section 5 discusses
the estimation and various tests, and section 6 explores the implications for credit risk
management and pricing. Finally, section 7 concludes.
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2 The model
The basic idea of the model is to let default probabilities and recovery rates be related
by letting them depend only on the state of the credit cycle. Default correlation be-
tween firms, dependence between recoveries of different firms, as well as the relationship
between recovery rates and default rates are driven entirely by the credit cycle. While
this might seem restrictive, this is of course a lot less restrictive than assuming that
variables are independent, and relationships are static.
The credit cycle is described by a two-state Markov chain. Let st be the unobserv-
able state of the cycle, with st = 0 corresponding to a credit downturn and st = 1
corresponding to a credit upturn. Also, let p be the probability of remaining in an
upturn and q the probability of remaining in a downturn. Then, following Hamilton
(1989), we can describe the dynamics of the state of the cycle as
st = (1− q) + (p+ q − 1)st−1 + vt (1)
where vt is a martingale difference sequence that can take a finite number of values.
Given the specification in (1) and taking into account that st is a binary variable, we
can easily obtain the probabilities of being in one state or another conditioned on the
state in the previous period.
Each firm in the population has a default probability which only depends on the
state of the cycle. We call the default probabilities in downturns r0, and the default
probability in upturns r1.
We assume that conditional on the cycle, defaults of firms are independent, i.e. that
any (unconditional) dependency is driven entirely by the cycle. The default indicator
1it of a firm i is zero if a firm has not defaulted in the period and is equal to 1 in the
period in which the firm defaults. In terms of this variable, our assumption is that
conditional on the state, 1it ⊥ 1jt for firms i 6= j. As a consequence of this assumption,
the number of defaults dt in the population of size Nt will be binomially distributed
with parameter rs, conditional on knowing the state.
The recovery rate for a default is drawn from a beta distribution. This distribution
is well suited to modelling recoveries as it has support [0, 1], is relatively flexible and
requires only two parameters (which we call α and β). It is in fact often used by rating
agencies for this purpose (see e.g. Gupton and Stein, 2002). We let the parameters of
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this beta distribution depend on the state of the cycle s, the seniority class of the debt
on which default occurs c and the industry of the issuer k, such that the recovery rate
of firm i at time t on debt of class c is drawn from a density
f(ytic) =
1
B(αsck, βsck)
yαsck−1tic (1− ytic)βsck−1. (2)
We assume that conditional on the state, ytic1 ⊥ ytjc2 for firms i 6= j and ∀c1, c2, i.e.
once we condition on the unobserved state, recovery rates of one defaulting firm are
assumed independent of recovery rates of all other defaulting firms. This means that
any dependence in the unconditional recoveries across firms will be driven entirely by
the unobserved state.
Also, we assume that recoveries are independent of the default events, i.e. 1it ⊥
ytjc for firms i 6= j, such that (unconditional) dependence between recoveries and the
aggregate number of defaults is entirely driven by the state of the credit cycle. This
assumption is of course crucial, and its validity will be examined below (see section 5).
Often, a single firm defaults on more than one class of debt. Recoveries associated
with one firm but across several classes of debt are unlikely to be independent. It is
likely that a high firm-level recovery implies higher instrument-level recoveries, and that
therefore recoveries on instruments issued by the same firm but of different seniority
classes exhibit positive dependence. Also, it would be natural to expect that higher
seniority classes observe a higher recovery. As it turns out, in the data, it is relatively
frequently the case that higher seniority classes recover less than the lower seniority
classes, however.5
In the absence of a model that relates firm-level recoveries to instrument-level re-
coveries (see e.g. Carey and Gordy, 2004, for a discussions of some of the issues), we
propose the relatively simple assumption that the dependence structure of recovery
rates across different seniority classes for the same firm is given by a Gaussian copula,
such that we can specify a correlation matrix Γ of recoveries across seniority classes.
This means that we do not impose a dependence structure that implies that higher
seniorities will always recover more, since this is not what we see in the data. When a
5This is likely to reflect the fact that the specific terms of debt contracts of a given seniority class
vary across firms, and that the labels of “Senior Unsecured” etc. do not always carry the same meaning
across firms. On average, higher seniority classes recover more, however, so these labels do contain
some information on potential recovery rates. It is also possible that this reflects aggregation issues
and the structure of our data, see section 4 for details.
7
firm defaults on only one class of debt, we interpret [2] as the density of the recovery
rate, and in the case where a firm defaults on more than one class of debt, we interpret
[2] as the marginal density of recoveries.
We obtain a likelihood function of the model as described in appendix A by em-
ploying a slightly modified version of the method proposed by Hamilton (1989).
3 Interpretations of the model
As a consequence of having probabilities of being in an upturn or downturn of the credit
cycle, the particular density describing possible recoveries at any particular point in time
will be a mixture of the two different beta densities for the two different states, with
the mixing probabilities being given by the probabilities of being in either state. This
gives considerably more flexibility in matching observed unconditional distributions of
recovery rates, and is in some sense similar to the nonparametric kernel density approach
of Renault and Scaillet (2004).6
We can also view the model as a discrete version of a reduced-form or intensity
model. According to the model, conditional on the state of the credit cycle, the firms
default independently, either with probability r0 (in downturns), or with probability r1
in upturns. This implies that the number of defaults in a given period, dt, is binomially
distributed. Taking limits of the binomial distribution as the size of the population
Nt →∞ and the success probability rs → 0, such that Ntrs = λts, where λts is constant
(for a given state in a given time period), the distribution of dt tends to a Poisson
distribution. In fact, since our Nt is always above 1000, and our per-period default
probabilities do not exceed 3%, the Poisson distribution is a very good approximation
of our implicitly assumed binomial distribution. We can view the counting process
describing the aggregate number of defaulted firms dt as the sum of Nt individual
counting processes that describe the default of individual firms. For this to work, the
intensities of the individual Poisson processes need to sum up to λts. This could be
achieved by e.g. assuming the individual default intensity of firms to be rs. These
intensities depend on an unobserved state; such that we can view the default process
of an individual firm as a Cox process, where the relevant conditioning information is
6It is similar in the sense that we are also using a mixture of beta distributions. The difference is
that obviously, a kernel density estimator will mix over a much larger number of densities (equal to
the number of observations), with mixing probabilities constant and equal across the kernel densities.
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the (unobserved) state of the credit cycle, i.e. our two-state Markov chain. Recoveries
are also assumed to depend on this unobserved Markov chain.
If the default counting process conditional on knowing the states s = {s0, s1, . . . , sT}
has a Poisson distribution, the default time τ of an individual firm will be exponentially
distributed. The survival probability of an individual firm from time t = 0 until time
T is given by
Pr(τ > T |s) = exp
{
T∑
t=0
rst
}
, (3)
and the unconditional probability is given by
Pr(τ > T ) = E
[
exp
{
T∑
t=0
rst
}]
, (4)
where the expectation is given over the probabilities of the states.
In fact, this is simply a discrete time version of the continuous-time models e.g.
used by Duffie and Singleton (1999) or Duffee (1999), apart from the fact that here
the unobserved process driving the default intensity is not a continuous-time Feller
square-root process, but a discrete time two-state Markov chain. Also, the recovery
assumptions are different; here, conditional on the state recovery is a beta-distributed
fraction of par.
4 Data
The data is extracted from the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Corporate Bond Default
Master Database. This data set consists of more than 2,000 defaulted bonds of US
firms from 1974 to 2005. Each entry in the database lists the name of the issuer of the
bond (this means that we can determine its industry as described by its SIC code), the
seniority of the bond, the date of default and the price of this bond per 100 dollars of
face value one month after the default event.
Typically, the database contains the prices of many bonds for a given firm and
seniority class on a given date, so we need to aggregate. We do this by taking weighted
averages (weighted by issue size).7
7This is something commonly used in the literature. See for example Varma and Cantor (2005).
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We also aggregate data across time into periods corresponding to calendar years.
We assume that a default of the same firm within twelve months of an initial default
event (e.g. in December and then March of the following year) represent a single default
event 8.
We calculate the recovery rate as the post-default price divided by the face value.
Some of the recovery rates calculated in this way are larger than 1. This probably
reflects the value of coupons. We scale the recovery rates by a factor of .9 to ensure
that our observations lie in the support of the beta distribution. Equivalently, we could
view our beta distribution as being defined over a support that equals the range of our
actual data.
The data set does not contain the total size of the population of firms from which
the defaults are drawn. This variable is necessary in order to calculate the probability of
observing dt defaults in [10]. To determine the population size we use default frequencies
as reported in Standard & Poor’s Quarterly Default Update from May 2006 (taken from
the CreditPro Database). Dividing the number of defaulting firms in each year in the
Altman data by Standard & Poor’s default frequency, we can obtain a number for the
total population of firms under the assumption that both data sets track the same set
of firms. The available default frequency data ranges from 1981 to 2005, so we lose
observations from periods 1974-1980. However, these years cover only 9 observations
in the Altman data.
After these adjustments, the final data set contains 1,078 observations. Descriptive
statistics for these observations are presented in Tables 1 to 3.
Table 1 reports the yearly statistics of our adjusted data set. The first column
shows the annual default frequencies as reported by Standard & Poor’s, while the other
columns refer to the main data set, containing the number of observations per year
and their means and standard deviation. It can already be seen that typical recession
years (as published by the NBER: 1990-91 and 2001) show higher default frequencies
and lower recoveries than years of economic expansion. This will of course play an
important role below.
8It is possible that the fact that we sometimes observe higher recoveries for bonds of lower seniorities
is related to this aggregation. In situations where default occurs on a junior security before they occur
on the senior security, it could between the earlier date and the later date bond prices fall as more
negative information about the firm becomes available, and that the recovery on junior securities could
therefore be higher.
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Tables 2 and 3 report the number of observations and the mean and standard
deviation of recoveries classified by seniority and industry respectively. These are in line
with those reported in other papers, although on average recoveries are slightly lower
here. In Table 2, it is shown that mean recovery increases with increasing seniority,
while standard deviation remains more or less constant across seniorities. In Table 3,
we see that the mean recovery is highest for utilities and lowest for telecoms.
5 Estimation and tests
The work of Altman and Kishore (1996) among others suggests that other important
determinants of recovery rates are seniority and industry. Ultimately, we are therefore
interested in constructing a model that takes into account the effects of the credit
cycle, but also industry and seniority. Initially, however, we examine how well the
model does using only the assumption about state dependence, ignoring the effects of
industry and seniority (i.e. we look at a version of the model where marginal recovery
rate distributions do not vary according to industry and seniority). Also, to sidestep
the issue of dependence of recoveries on issues of the same firm, but with different
seniorities, we initially drop all default events for which we observe recoveries on more
than one seniority (the remaining observations are roughly representative of the whole
sample). We estimate a basic static model, in which recovery rate distributions and
default probabilities do not depend on the state, and contrast this with a basic dynamic
model in which both recovery rate distributions and default probabilities are state
dependent.
We then proceed towards a model that takes into account industry and seniority.
Since we do not have a sufficient number of default events for every possible combination
of industry, seniority and state of the credit cycle, however, we will need to aggregate
industries into broad groups.
In order to check that the aggregation is reasonable, we first allow marginal dis-
tributions to vary across industries only, and check which industries can be grouped.
Next, we allow marginal distributions to vary across seniorities only. We can then look
at the dependence of recoveries on issues of the same firm but with different seniorities.
For this we need to add the observations dropped at the earlier stage back in, and look
at the full data set.
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Finally, we combine information on industry and seniority to construct the dynamic
industry/ seniority model. This will be contrasted with a static industry/ seniority
model.
At the various stages, different tests will be performed.
5.1 Basic model
5.1.1 The basic static model
In the static model recovery rate distributions and default probabilities do not depend
on the state. We also ignore industry and seniority. We estimate on the sub-sample of
observations for which we do not observe recoveries across different seniorities for the
same firm.
Estimates of this model are provided in Table 4. With the estimated distribution
parameters we obtain an implied mean recovery of 37%.9 The default probability in
this static case is found by taking the average of all the default frequencies in our data
set and it is equal to 1.47%.
5.1.2 The basic dynamic model
In the basic dynamic model recovery rate distributions and default probabilities depend
on the state, but we ignore industry and seniority. We estimate on the sub-sample of
observations for which we do not observe recoveries across different seniorities for the
same firm.
The estimated parameters are reported in Table 4. Average recoveries are much
lower in downturns (31% versus 47%), and default probabilities are higher (2.69% versus
0.86%).
We test whether the estimated parameters values for downturns are significantly
different from the estimated parameter values for upturns via likelihood ratio tests: We
first test whether the recovery rate distribution parameters parameters are different,
and then test whether the default probabilities are different. The p-value are less than
0.01% for both tests, so that the null hypothesis of no difference across states is rejected
both for recovery rate distributions and default probabilities. The credit cycle matters.
9The mean of a beta distribution with parameters α and β is αα+β . Note that we also have to divide
the resulting number by 0.9 in order to undo the scaling adjustment.
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We check the recovery rate densities implied by the models using a method pro-
posed by Diebold et al. (1998), described appendix B. The basic idea is that applying
the probability integral transform based on the predicted (filtered) distributions to the
actual observations (the recovery rates in our case) should yield an i.i.d.-uniform series
(the PIT series) under the null hypothesis that the density forecasts are correct. De-
partures from uniformity are easily visible when plotting histograms, and departures
from i.i.d. are visible when plotting autocorrelation functions of the PIT series. We
also test for departures from uniformity using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test,10
and departures from i.i.d-ness using the Ljung-Box (L-B) test.
The p-value of the K-S statistic for the basic static model is 2.32%, versus 6.38%
for the basic dynamic model, indicating that the dynamic model does a better job at
matching recovery rate distributions. The p-value of the L-B test is virtually zero for
the basic static model, indicating that the static model clearly does not describe the
dynamics of recovery rates adequately. For the basic dynamic model, the p-value of
the L-B test is 20.56%, indicating that it is much better at describing the dynamics of
recovery rates. This can also be seen by examining the histograms and correlograms of
the transformed series (see figures 2 and 3).
We also check the goodness of fit of our estimated default rates. For this purpose, we
regress observed default rates on a constant and estimated default rates of the dynamic
model (for each of its variants). These estimated default rates are obtained by mixing,
for each period, the default rates of both states where the weightings are the (smoothed)
probabilities of being in one state or the other. Given the coefficients of this regression
we can test both the static and dynamic models. The static model would be correct if
the coefficient of the variables is not significantly different from zero, so that the only
explanatory variable was the constant (the static default rate). The null hypothesis for
the dynamic model is that the constant and the coefficient of the variable are equal to
zero and one respectively. Table 12 reports the p-values for all these hypothesis. We
see how the static model is clearly rejected, while we obtain very high p-values (and
then accept) the dynamic model. 11
10The distribution of this test is derived under the null that the distribution to which the empirical
distribution is compared is known, and not estimated, which is not the case in our application. Some
care therefore has to be taken in interpreting the p-values.
11The p-values are those of standard t-tests. In order to verify that these are appropriate, we
bootstrapped the t-statistics of the regression to confirm that they do indeed follow a t-distribution.
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We also plot the (smoothed) probabilities of being in the credit downturn over time
and compare these to NBER recession dates in figure 1. As can be seen, the credit cycle
had two major downturns, around the recession of the early 90s and around 2001, but
in each case, the credit downturn started well before the recession and ended after it.12
This difference between the credit cycle and the business cycle might explain the low
explanatory variable of macroeconomic variables documented by Altman et al. (2005).
Raw correlations between the smoothed upturn indicator and various macroeco-
nomic variables are reported in Table 14. We can see for instance that the upturn
indicator is positively correlated with consumption growth (a correlation of 34%).
We also examine our assumption that recoveries and default probabilities are inde-
pendent conditional on the state of the credit cycle (see equation 7). We regress annual
mean recoveries on default rates for the whole sample. The coefficient is significantly
different from zero at 5% (the correlation between the two variables is -0.43). We also
run two regressions separately in the two subsamples given by the periods for which
the smoothed probabilities of being in a credit upturn or downturn are unambiguous
(i.e. either 1 or 0). The coefficients of the regressions in the two sub-samples are not
significantly different from zero at 5% (the correlations are 0.47 in upturns and -0.12
in downturns). This seems to support our assumption.
5.2 Adding information on industry
We now let the parameters of the recovery rate density depend on industry, as well as
on the unobserved credit cycle. We have 12 industries, which implies that we need to
estimated 48 recovery rate distribution parameters (2 states, 12 industries, 2 parame-
ters per beta distribution), 2 transition probabilities and 2 default probabilities. The
estimated parameters of the recovery rate distributions and the implied mean recoveries
are provided in Table 5.
As discussed, in order to construct a combined industry / seniority model, due to
data limitations, we will have to aggregate. We aggregate industry into three groups:
1. Group A: Financials, Leisure, Transportation, Utilities
2. Group B: Consumer, Energy, Manufacturing, Others
12The “semi-downturn” of 1986 consists mostly of defaulting oil companies. It is probable that this
is related to the drop in oil prices at the time.
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3. Group C: Building, Mining, Services, Telecoms
For the given sample, these groupings roughly correspond to industries with high,
medium and low mean recovery rates respectively. We test whether the parameters
of the recovery rate distribution are significantly different within these groups (i.e.
whether it the groupings are reasonable). The p-value of the likelihood ratio test is
10%, which indicates that the null of the same parameters within the groups cannot be
rejected at conventional levels of significance.
5.3 Adding information on seniority
We now estimate a model in which the parameters of the recovery rate densities depend
on the state of the credit cycle and seniority (and ignore industry for the time being).
We observe 4 different categories of seniority (Senior Secured, Senior Unsecured, Senior
Subordinated, Subordinated). The estimated recovery rate parameters and the mean
recoveries implied by these parameters are shown in Table 6. We observe that although
senior secured bonds have a higher recovery in upturns on average (52%), they have
very similar (low) recoveries to bonds of all other seniorities in downturns (29%). As
has been pointed out by Frye (2000), this might have important consequences for risk
management, as instruments that are though of as “safe” turn out to be safe only in good
times. Acharya et al. (forthcoming) also find that in times of distress, senior securities
recover significantly less, while recoveries on bank debt and junior securities are not
significantly affected. They hypothesize that it is especially holders of senior debt that
lose their bargaining power in times of distress, and hence recover less. Acharya et
al. (forthcoming) also argue that that if the senior debt is collateralized, this effect is
mitigated. Based on our estimation results, we cannot corroborate this result. For our
data, senior debt is strongly affected by a credit downturn, regardless of whether or not
it is secured.
5.3.1 Dependence across seniorities
So far we have dealt only with observations for which we do not observe several re-
coveries across different seniorities for the same firm, which we now add back in. It
is unreasonable to assume that these observations of recoveries represent independent
15
draws. As described above, letting our marginal recovery rate densities be beta densities
as before, we model this dependence with a Gaussian copula.
In order to estimate this dependence, we add the observations of default events for
which we observe recovery rates across instruments of different seniorities back in. For
these observations, seniority seems to mean something quite different, as can be seen
from Table 2. One explanation for this would be that recovery on a bond that is labelled
as “senior unsecured” (for example) depends not so much on this label, but much more
on whether or not there exists a cushion of junior debt.
Since categories of seniority seem to have a very different meaning when we observe
recoveries across instruments of different seniorities, we allow the parameters of our
marginal recovery rate densities for a given seniority to be distinct for the cases where
either recovery only on a single seniority is observed, or whether recovery is observed
on more than one seniority.
The estimated parameters of the marginal beta densities are reported in Table 7,
and the estimated correlation matrix is presented in Table 8.
Implied mean recoveries of this model are presented in Table 7. We can see that
junior debt recovers less and senior debt recovers more for default events for which we
observe recoveries for more than one seniority. For example, in an upturn, Senior Unse-
cured debt would recover (on average) 46% and Subordinated debt would recover 34%
if recoveries are observed on more than one seniority, whereas they would recover (on
average) 42% and 37% respectively if recovery was only observed on a single seniority.
At 5% significance, only the correlations between Senior Unsecured, Senior Subor-
dinated and Subordinated seniorities are significantly different from zero. These cor-
relations are positive, indicating that a high recovery on e.g. Senior Unsecured debt
for a defaulting firm indicates a likely high recovery on its Senior Subordinated Debt.
The recovery on Senior Secured debt seems to be less strongly related to recoveries
on different seniorities. This could reflect that the existence of a junior debt cushion
matters less, and the quality of the collateral matters more for Senior Secured debt.
5.4 The industry / seniority dynamic model
Having decided on groupings of industries such that we now have a sufficient amount
of data for each possible combination of seniority group, industry group, and state of
the business cycle, we are now in a position to estimate a combined industry / seniority
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model. The recovery rate density parameters are in tables 9 and 11.
For comparison purposes, we also estimate a static industry / seniority dynamic
model, which is identical with the dynamic industry / seniority model except for the
fact that the static model ignores the credit cycle. We calculate the PIT series for
both models, and plot histograms and correlograms in figures 2 and 3. We can see that
the unconditional distributions seem to be closer to uniformity, suggesting that taking
into account industry and seniority helps in describing distributions of recovery rates.
Looking at the correlograms, it is also apparent, however, that the static version of the
industry / seniority model is again unable to explain the dynamics of recovery rates.
We conclude that allowing the parameters of the density of recoveries to depend on the
credit cycle allows for a better match of the empirically observed recovery rates.13
6 Implications
Altman et al. (2005) suggest that a correlation between default rates and recovery rates
can imply much higher VaR numbers than those implied by independence between these
two variables. In a completely static model, they compare VaRs calculated in the case
of independence, and in the case of perfect rank correlation between default rates and
recovery rates.
We are in a position to calculate the loss distributions and statistics of loss distri-
butions (such as the VaR) implied by our estimated model; i.e. taking into account the
estimated degree of dependence between default probabilities and recovery rates, which
in our case is driven entirely by the credit cycle.
We calculate (by simulation of 10,000 paths) the one-year loss distribution of a hy-
pothetical portfolio of 500 bonds. For this calculation, we have to chose the probability
that we attach to being in a credit downturn today. We examine cases with this prob-
ability being equal to one (we know that we are in a downturn today), zero (we know
that we are in an upturn today) and 33.5%, which corresponds to the unconditional
probability of being in a downturn, given our estimated transition probabilities (we
have no information on the current state of the cycle).
13We also calculate a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the PIT series, and find a p-value of 9.91% for
the static model, and a p-value of 14.37% for the dynamic model. Note that the caveat mentioned
above applies.
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Comparing the basic static model and the basic dynamic model (i.e. ignoring indus-
try and seniority for the time being), we can see from Table 13 that the 95% VaR is a
2.39% loss on the portfolio assuming the world is dynamic as described in our model,
versus a 1.58% loss on the portfolio if we had assumed that the world is static. This is
a very sizeable difference in risk. It arises because the dynamic model allows for credit
downturns, in which not only the default rate is very high, but also, the recovery rate
is very low. This amplifies losses vis-a-vis the static case.
Even supposing that we are in an upturn today, the dynamic model still produces
a 95% VaR of 1.96%, which is larger than the static VaR because even though we are
in an upturn today, we might go into a credit downturn tomorrow, with higher default
rates and lower recoveries.
The loss density implied by the dynamic model based on the unconditional prob-
ability of being in a downturn is compared to the loss density implied by the static
model in figure 4. The dynamic model loss density is bimodal, reflecting the possibility
of ending up either in an upturn with low default probabilities and high recoveries, or
ending up in a downturn, with high default probabilities and low recoveries. As can be
seen, the tail of the loss distribution implied by the dynamic model is much larger.
We also show this comparison for the case of assuming that we are in an upturn
today in figure 4. It can be seen that even being in an upturn today, the possibility of
going into a downturn tomorrow produces a bimodality in the loss distribution (albeit
smaller) implied by the dynamic model, and a larger tail than that produced by the
static model.
Looking at our industry / seniority model, we can see that the underestimation of
the VaR of the static model seems to be most pronounced for Group C, our low recovery
industries (including e.g. Telecoms), where the VaR based on the dynamic model can
be up to 1.7 times as large.
It is possible that these results have implications for capital requirements. Altman
et al. (2005) argue that credit risk is cyclical, which would lead to capital requirements
calculated under the Basel II Internal Ratings-based Approach to be cyclical. Con-
cretely, capital requirements should increase in credit downturns, as the estimated loss
given default and the default probability rise simultaneously. They note that regula-
tion should encourage banks to use “long-term average recovery rates” (and presumably
default probabilities) in calculating capital requirements to dampen the procyclicality
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of capital requirements. In terms of the model presented here, one could argue that
the appropriate “long-term” recovery rates and default probabilities to use would be
the unconditional ones. This would be tantamount to discarding information on the
state of the cycle when calculating capital requirements, but at least it would avoid
calculating them on the of a wrong (static) model.
Of course, this assumes that the data on bond defaults and recoveries is indicative
of bank loans (which might not necessarily be the case). The fact that Acharya et al.
(forthcoming) report that recoveries on bank debt seem to be largely unaffected by their
distress variable (while reporting other results that appear to be largely consistent with
our results) casts doubt on this idea, although it is likely that default rates of bank loans
and bonds are more similar. To answer the question conclusively, our model would have
to be estimated on bank loan data.
Also, the increase in risk associated with negatively correlated default frequencies
and recovery rates is likely to have an effect on pricing, and might (at least in part)
explain the “corporate spread puzzle” (see e.g. Chen et al., 2006), i.e. the fact that
structural models of corporate debt that assume that the recovery rate is a fixed pa-
rameter seem to be unable to match observed corporate bond yields with reasonable
risk-aversion parameters.
7 Conclusions
This paper formalizes the idea that default probabilities and recovery rates are related
through the credit cycle: it proposes a model that is estimated and found to fit the
data reasonably well in various ways. We demonstrate that taking into account the
dynamic nature of credit risk in this way implies dramatically higher risk, as evident
in our VaR calculations, since default probabilities and recovery rates are negatively
related. The estimated credit downturns seem to start much earlier and end later than
the recessions as reported by the NBER, indicating that the credit cycle is to some
extent distinct from the business cycle, which might explain why Altman et al. (2005)
find that macroeconomic variables in general have low explanatory power for recovery
rates.
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A The likelihood function
Let dt be the number of defaulted firms observed in t. Firms are be indexed by i. In
terms of the previously defined default indicator, dt =
∑
i 1it. Different seniority classes
are indexed by c (c ranges from 1 to C).
Let Yt be a matrix of dimension dt ×C containing observations on the dt defaulted
firms, one row per firm, for all different seniority classes c. Denote the typical element
as ytic, and denote each row in this matrix as yti..
Then our objective is to maximize the following likelihood function
L =
T∑
t=1
log f(Yt, dt|Ωt−1), (5)
where Ωt−1 is all information available at t − 1, which includes observed defaults up
to that point. Note that we have made explicit that there is information in both the
matrix of recoveries Yt and the number of its rows, dt, about the state, i.e. identification
of the state is obtained through both the number of defaults and recoveries.
Letting s denote state as above, we can write
f(Yt, dt|Ωt−1) = f(Yt, dt|st = 1,Ωt−1) Pr(st = 1|Ωt−1)
+ f(Yt, dt|st = 0,Ωt−1) Pr(st = 0|Ωt−1). (6)
We assumed independence between recovery rates and defaults. This implies that
the values of the recovery rates in the rows of Yt, yti., are independent of dt conditional
on the state. Once the state is known, the number of defaults does not contain infor-
mation about the likely values of recoveries, and the values of recoveries do not contain
information about the likely number of defaults. This allows us to write
f(Yt, dt|Ωt−1) = f(Yt|st = 1,Ωt−1) Pr(dt|st = 1,Ωt−1) Pr(st = 1|Ωt−1)
+ f(Yt|st = 0,Ωt−1) Pr(dt|st = 0,Ωt−1) Pr(st = 0|Ωt−1). (7)
The contribution to the likelihood function of a given period is given by the sum of two
products, one for each state. The components of these products are the state-conditional
density function of the observed recovery rates, the state-conditional probability of the
number of defaults and the probability of being in that state. These components are
now described separately.
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A.1 State-conditional recoveries
We have assumed that conditional on the state, recoveries of different firms are inde-
pendent. This allows us to factorize, such that the conditional density for a given state
st can be written as
f(Yt|st,Ωt−1) =
dt∏
i=1
f(yti.|st,Ωt−1). (8)
The parameters of our marginal distributions of recovery rates vary according to
state s, seniority class c and industry k. The marginal density was assumed to be given
by
f(ytic|st,Ωt−1) = 1
B(αsck, βsck)
yαsck−1tic (1− ytic)βsck−1. (9)
We assumed that the copula of the elements of yti. is Gaussian with correlation ma-
trix Γ. Together with the assumption of the marginal distribution in [9] this determines
the densities f(yti.|st,Ωt−1) in [8].
A.2 State-conditional number of defaults
Since we assumed that conditional on the state, defaults are independent with probabil-
ity rs, the probability of observing dt defaults is binomial conditional on the state. Let
Nt be the number of (defaulted and non-defaulted) firms in the population in period t,
then we can calculate the probability of observing dt defaults in a given state st as
Pr(dt|st,Ωt−1) =
(
Nt
dt
)
rNts (1− rs)Nt−dt (10)
A.3 Probabilities of the states
Finally, the probability of being in one state can be derived from the total probability
theorem. Obviously,
Pr(st = 1|Ωt−1) = p · Pr(st−1 = 1|Ωt−1) + (1− q) · Pr(st−1 = 0|Ωt−1), (11)
where we used the notation defined previously, p = Pr(st = 1|st−1 = 1,Ωt−1), the
probability of remaining in state 1, and (1 − q) = Pr(st = 0|st−1 = 0,Ωt−1), the
probability of moving from state 0 to state 1.
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We can rearrange [11] to obtain
Pr(st = 1|Ωt−1) = (1− q) + (p+ q − 1) Pr(st−1 = 1|Ωt−1) (12)
The probability Pr(st−1 = 1|Ωt−1) can be obtained via a recursive application of Bayes’
rule:
Pr(st−1 = 1|Ωt−1) =
f(Yt−1|st−1 = 1,Ωt−2) Pr(dt−1|st−1 = 1,Ωt−2) Pr(st−1 = 1|Ωt−2)
f(Yt−1|Ωt−2) (13)
For a given parameter vector, the likelihood can therefore be calculated recursively,
given some suitable initial conditions, e.g. the unconditional probabilities of being in
each state implied by the transition matrix.
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B The Diebold-Gunther-Tay test
Diebold et al. (1998) propose a test (DGT test) for evaluating density forecasts. The
basic idea is that since under the null hypothesis the forecasts are equal to the true den-
sities (conditioned on past information), applying the cumulative distribution function
(the probability integral transform) to the series of observations should yield a series of
iid uniform-[0, 1] variables. Whether the transformed variables are iid uniform can be
tested in various ways, e.g. via a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Departures from unifor-
mity or iid-ness are also easily visible when looking at histograms and autocorrelation
functions of the transformed series.
In order to apply the DGT test to our predicted recovery rate densities, we create
a vector y† with typical element y†t = vec
(
Yt
T
)
. For each element in the vector, we
can now create a density forecast from our estimated model which conditions on all
previous elements in this vector, and uses the filtered state probabilities. Due to our
independence assumptions, this is mostly straightforward (most previous elements do
not enter the conditional distributions). A slight complication arises due to the as-
sumption of a Gaussian copula between recoveries of the same firm but across different
seniorities. For these observations, conditional densities can easily be calculated via the
conditional Gaussian distribution, though.
Applying the cumulative distribution function associated with these density fore-
casts to the vector y† yields a vector of transformed variables which we call z. Under
the null hypothesis that the density forecasts are correct, the elements of z should be
an iid uniform series. Serial correlation of the series would indicate that we have not
correctly conditioned on the relevant information. A departure from uniformity would
indicate that the marginal distributions are inappropriate.
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C Tables and Figures
C.1 Tables
Table 1
Recovery Rates Statistics by Year
This table reports some annual statistics of the sample used in the paper.
First column figures are default frequencies extracted from Standard & Poor’s
(2006). The other three columns are the number of observations and the mean
and standard deviation for recovery rates.
Year
Default
frequency
Number of
observations
Mean
Recovery
Standard
Deviation
1981 0.14% 1 12.00 -
1982 1.18% 12 39.64 14.27
1983 0.75% 5 48.24 20.35
1984 0.90% 11 48.88 16.59
1985 1.10% 14 48.17 21.28
1986 1.71% 26 35.19 18.16
1987 0.94% 19 52.89 27.05
1988 1.42% 35 37.19 20.33
1989 1.67% 41 43.55 28.29
1990 2.71% 81 25.49 21.80
1991 3.26% 94 40.37 26.27
1992 1.37% 37 51.50 24.02
1993 0.55% 21 37.58 19.61
1994 0.61% 16 43.77 24.88
1995 1.01% 24 43.76 24.69
1996 0.49% 18 43.59 23.79
1997 0.62% 23 54.95 23.76
1998 1.31% 32 46.55 24.52
1999 2.15% 94 30.29 19.92
2000 2.36% 112 28.03 23.81
2001 3.78% 137 24.71 18.05
2002 3.60% 100 29.78 16.69
2003 1.92% 58 39.24 23.48
2004 0.73% 35 50.59 24.13
2005 0.55% 32 58.71 23.41
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Table 2
Recovery Rates by Seniority
This table reports the number of observations and the mean and standard
deviation of recovery rates in our sample classified by seniority, for the whole
sample (all default events), for default events for which we only observe
recovery on a single instrument (with only one seniority), and for default
events for which we observe recoveries on at least two different seniorities.
Seniority
Number of
observations
Mean
Recovery
Standard
Deviation
All default events
Senior Secured 210 42.26 25.76
Senior Unsecured 376 36.86 23.54
Senior Subordinated 334 32.73 23.66
Subordinated 158 34.17 23.00
Default events with single seniority only
Senior Secured 158 40.11 23.90
Senior Unsecured 276 35.62 22.09
Senior Subordinated 226 33.69 23.29
Subordinated 90 37.91 20.21
Default events with multiple seniorities only
Senior Secured 52 48.81 29.77
Senior Unsecured 100 40.30 26.85
Senior Subordinated 108 30.70 24.28
Subordinated 68 29.24 25.42
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Table 3
Recovery Rates by Industry
This table reports the number of observations and the mean and standard
deviation of recovery rates in our sample classified by industry.
Industry
Number of
observations
Mean
Recovery
Standard
Deviation
Building 15 32.19 30.32
Consumer 152 35.56 22.89
Energy 50 37.65 17.09
Financial 104 36.91 25.99
Leisure 53 46.03 27.77
Manufacturing 368 35.78 22.89
Mining 15 35.05 18.67
Services 76 33.41 25.83
Telecom 123 31.53 21.14
Transportation 66 38.99 24.01
Utility 23 46.93 28.14
Others 33 38.01 23.44
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Table 8
Dependence across Seniorities Model - Parameter
Estimates (Correlations)
These are the correlations implied by the Dependence across Seniorities
Model. None of the correlations involving Senior Secured are different from
zero at a 5% level of significance.
S.Sec. S.Uns. S.Sub. Sub.
S.Sec. 1.0000
S.Uns. 0.2942 1.0000
S.Sub. 0.1935 0.5449 1.0000
Sub. -0.2427 0.4976 0.8008 1.0000
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Table 11
Industry / Seniority Model - Parameter Estimates
(Correlations)
These are the correlations implied by the Full Model. None of the correlations
involving Senior Secured are different from zero at a 5% level of significance.
S.Sec. S.Uns. S.Sub. Sub.
S.Sec. 1.0000
S.Uns. 0.4216 1.0000
S.Sub. 0.1606 0.5281 1.0000
Sub. -0.2429 0.6911 0.7595 1.0000
Table 12
Diagnostic Tests
This table presents diagnostic tests of the recoveries and default frequencies.
Recovery rates tests are in Panel A. The first column is the p-value for the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test where the null hypothesis is that the trans-
formed series is drawn from a uniform(0,1) distribution. The second column
reports the p-values of the Ljung-Box (L-B) test, where the null is that the
transformed series is white noise. Panel B reports the test for the estimated
default frequencies. The p-value reported is under the null hypothesis that
the model is correctly specified.
Panel A: Recovery Rates
Model K-S L-B
Basic Static 0.0232 0.0000
Basic Dynamic 0.0638 0.2056
Full Static 0.0991 0.0000
Full Dynamic 0.1437 0.4892
Panel B: Default rates
Model p-value
Basic Static 0.0000
Basic Dynamic 0.9641
Full Static 0.0000
Full Dynamic 0.9190
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Figure 1. Probabilities of being in the credit downturn versus NBER
recessions (annual)
This figure plots the annual smoothed probability of being in a credit downturn as estimated on the
basis of the basic dynamic model (no industry and seniority), assuming that the last quarter of 1981
was a credit downturn with a probability corresponding to the unconditional probability of being in a
downturn. This is contrasted with NBER recessions (grey areas).
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Figure 2. Histograms of the DGT-transformed recoveries.
This figure presents the histograms of the DGT-transformed recoveries for (a) the basic static model,
(b) the basic dynamic model, (c) the full static model, and (d) the full dynamic model.
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Figure 3. Correlograms of the DGT-transformed recoveries
This figure presents the correlograms of the DGT-transformed recoveries for (a) the basic static model,
(b) the basic dynamic model, (c) the full static model, and (d) the full dynamic model
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Figure 4. Simulated loss density
This figure contrasts the simulated loss density (pdf), of the basic model (no industry and seniority),
for the static version (i.e. default probability and recovery rate distribution do not vary with the credit
cycle) and the dynamic version (default probability and recovery rate distribution depend on the credit
cycle). For the dynamic model, the probability of being in a credit downturn is assumed to be equal
to zero in the upper panel, the unconditional probability in the middle one and one in the lower panel.
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